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Queering Indigenous Legal Studies
A handful of scholars have examined sex, gender, and sexuality in relation to
Indigenous laws; yet their work is infrequently taken up in the field, and there is a
broader need for conversations about what it means to "queer" Indigenous legal
studies. In this paper, I centre and examine work that contributes to this queering
so as to promote inclusive critical legal education and engagement. I also discuss
the implications of not attending to sexuality and develop preliminary propositions
for queering Indigenous legal studies.
Un petit nombre d'universitaires ont etudie les questions de sexe, de genre et de
sexualite en lien avec les lois autochtones. Pourtant, leurs travaux ne sont pas
souvent mis en contexte dans la pratique, et il est fort necessaire de discuter de
tout ce qui entoure le fait d'integrer la question de Ihomosexualite (, queer -) dans
les etudes legales autochtones. L'auteure examine les travaux qui contribuent a
cette integration (, queering -) afin de promouvoir la formation critique inclusive
en droit et Iengagement. Elle discute egalement des consequences qu'entraine
le fait de ne pas se preoccuper de sexualite, et elle formule des propositions
preliminaires pour introduire la question de Ihomosexualite dans les etudes
legales autochtones.
* Lecturer, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo. The research in
this article was supported by a SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellowship, which was done in affiliation with the
Indigenous Law Research Unit, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. The author would like to thank
Val Napoleon, John Borrows, and Brock Roe for their comments, as well as the anonymous reviewers
for their feedback. The author is also grateful to colleagues who gathered at Dalhousie University and
the University of Victoria where presentations of earlier drafts of this paper were giver
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Introduction
When reflecting on Indigenous studies, Chris Finley argues that while
gender analysis has somewhat made its way into the field, sexuality is
especially under-discussed and silenced and she argues for the importance
of queering Indigenous studies.1 Finley's analysis is important and there
is a need to expand this conversation to explicitly address Indigenous
laws and to queer Indigenous legal studies. It is necessary to consider
Indigenous laws (Indigenous peoples' own legal orders)2 because they
are a central aspect of Indigenous self-determination and sovereignty.
Indigenous legal studies includes analyses of Indigenous laws themselves,
1. Chris Finley, "Decolonizing the Queer Native Body (and Recovering the Native Bull-Dyke):
Bringing 'Sexy Back' and Out of Native Studies' Closet" in Qwo-Li Driskill et al, eds, Queer
Indigenous Studies: Critical Interventions in Theory, Politics, and Literature (Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 2011) 31 at 31-32 [Driskill et al, Queer Indigenous Studies]. Finley uses the language
of Native studies.
2. I use "Indigenous law" to refer to Indigenous peoples' own legal orders for managing conflicts in
their societies, and for contending with inter-societal relations. Whether used in the plural or singular,
it should always be assumed that a multitude of Indigenous legal orders exist, each withvarious means
of engaging, enacting, and interpreting law.
3. See for example: John Borrows, Canada Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2010) [Borrows, Canada s Indigenous Constitution]; Valerie Ruth Napoleon, Ayook:
Gitksan Legal Order, Law, and Legal Theory (PhD Dissertation, University of Victoria Faculty of
Law, 2009) [unpublished] [Napoleon, Ayook]; Gordon Christie, "Culture, Self-Determination and
Colonialism: Issues Around the Revitalization of Indigenous Legal Traditions" (2007) 6:1 Indigenous
LJ 13.
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but also steps back and examines how Indigenous laws are engaged in
academia-through theories, research, and pedagogy.4
It is all too common in academic (and non-academic) discussions
about Indigenous law that gender is under-discussed. Sexuality (sexual
orientation, preferences, and divergent sexual practices across gender and
sex) is typically absent and there is very little discussion about 2LGBTQ
social and legal issues as they relate to Indigenous laws.6 Furthermore,
few have discussed how heteronormative oppression can be both
perpetuated through, but also challenged by, Indigenous laws. Indigenous
legal education is an important site for engaging critical discussions
about sexuality and power, and there is a need to consider the following
questions: What would it look like to queer Indigenous legal studies? What
might this mean? What might this queering entail? Does Indigenous legal
studies need to be queered? What are the implications of doing so? What
are the implications of not doing so? These questions are not central in the
field and I argue that queering Indigenous legal studies is necessary and
urgent for inclusive legal practice and education. The overwhelming lack
of discussion about sexuality and Indigenous laws needs to be addressed.
Examining this problem through a queer framework interrogates how
ideas about sex, gender, sexuality, and power are operating in and through
Indigenous law and legal education.
This paper proceeds in four parts. First, I argue that it is important
to bring various perspectives together to foster this conversation about
queering. Second, I do not assert that no one writes about sexuality and
Indigenous laws; rather the problem is that work in this area is scarce,
and what has been produced is infrequently taken up in the field to think
more broadly about the politics of queering. I focus on three pieces (by
Andrew Gilden, Jennifer Denetdale, and Val Napoleon) to consider the
4. The term "Indigenous legal studies" is used to legitimize research and teaching pertaining to
Indigenous laws as an area of study in its own right. Indigenous legal studies should be understood
as distinct from anthropological work on "customs." I do not mean to suggest that anthropologists
as a whole do not study law however, see for example the work of Bruce Miller in the area of legal
anthropology. My focus on Indigenous legal studies, while informed by my own experience within
this field in Canada, draws more broadly on Canadian and American literature throughout this article.
There are so few resources about 2LGBTQ issues and Indigenous laws that it is important to work
broadly here, though an analysis about distinctions that might exist between the field in Canada and
the U.S. could be worthwhile in future work.
5. See Emily Snyder, "Indigenous Feminist Legal Theory" (2014) 26:2 CJWL 365 [Snyder,
"IFLT"].
6. 2LGBTQ: two-spirit, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer identifying people. I am using
the "2" at the beginning of the term so as to not treat Indigenous conceptualizations of sex, gender,
and sexuality as a tag-on to an already existing term, though not all Indigenous people identify as
"two-spirit," and thus this move is a potentially problematic way of centring indigeneity (see also the
discussion in part III pertaining to identity hierarchies).
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contributions of their work on 2LBGTQ issues in Indigenous law for
queering Indigenous legal studies.7 Third, I contend that their common
effort to take sexuality and Indigenous laws seriously has had little traction
and I consider what some of the challenges are for centring sexuality
in Indigenous legal studies. Lastly, I present preliminary propositions
for queering Indigenous legal studies. The focus of my argument is
to demonstrate the need for queering Indigenous legal studies and a
framework for how to do this is only introductorily engaged here.
"Queer" is used in different ways. It is sometimes used to speak
generally to non-normative politics. I use "queer" in this article to focus on
sex, gender, and sexuality, given my concerns noted above, although I do
at times also use queer to unsettle that which is normative-for example,
to trouble my own social location as a white, heterosexual woman writing
in the area of Indigenous law. In drawing on the theories below, I aim
to denaturalize the ways that I (and others) experience privilege and
oppression. Queering Indigenous legal studies is valuable for Indigenous
legal revitalization, and it is also important for non-Indigenous people to
participate in the dismantling ofheteronormative, patriarchal, and colonial
oppression.
I. Interdisciplinary conversations
Queer theories are not discussed in relation to Indigenous legal studies, yet
they have much to offer to one another and to critical legal education. There
is much to be gained by bringing various perspectives together to foster a
dynamic conversation about queering Indigenous laws. In this section, I
place (1) queer Indigenous studies, (2) queer legal studies, (3) Indigenous
legal studies, and (4) Indigenous feminist legal studies into conversation.
The discussion that follows introduces the different approaches and
explicates dominant patterns instead of the exceptions (examples of
exceptions are analyzed in the next section). Bringing these approaches
together illustrates how we are at the cusp of queering Indigenous legal
studies.
As noted, Finley (among others8) argues that there is a need to
queer Indigenous studies.9 Finley and Driskill et al., demonstrate that
7. Andrew Gilden, "Preserving the Seeds of Gender Fluidity: Tribal Courts and the Berdache
Tradition" (2007) 13:2 Mich J Gender & L 237; Jennifer Nez Denetdale, "Securing Navajo National
Boundaries: War, Patriotism, Tradition, and the Dine Marriage Act of 2005" (2009) 24:2 Wicazo Sa
Rev 131 [Denetdale, "Securing Boundaries"]; Val Napoleon, "Raven's Garden: A Discussion about
Aboriginal Sexual Orientation and Transgender Issues" (2002) 17:2 CJLS 149 [Napoleon, "Raven's
Garden"].
8. See Driskill et al, Queer Indigenous Studies, supra note 1.
9. Finley, supra note 1.
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the conversation between queer studies and Indigenous studies is vital
as it brings heteronormativity and colonialism into an explicit analytic
relationship with one another.1" Finley asks, "[c]an Native peoples
decolonize themselves without taking colonial discourses of sexualities
seriously?"1 The answer to this question, put simply, is "no." Colonial
oppression intersects with and is upheld by other forms of oppression-
for example, racism and heteropatriarchy. 2 As Driskill et al. explain,
"settler colonialism is the historical, institutional, and discursive root
of heteronormative binary sex/gender systems on stolen land. In this
reading, to interrogate heteronormativity is to critique colonial power,
which then necessarily intersects the work of decolonization pursued
by queer Indigenous people." 3 Finley argues that "[c]olonialism needs
heteropatriarchy to naturalize hierarchies and unequal gender relations"
that are necessary for the attempted destruction of Indigenous social,
economic, and political structures. 4 Thus, while all LGBTQ people are
faced with the ideological and material realities of heteronormativity,
Indigenous people and peoples' experiences with these problems are
markedly different.15
The deployment of western norms pertaining to sex, gender, and
sexuality onto Indigenous peoples has been exercised in many ways, for
instance through sexual violence most often targeting Indigenous women
and girls (historically and presently), 6 residential schools," the attempted
destruction of Indigenous kinship patterns in favour of the nuclear
family," nation-state and empire building (which relies, in part, on the
nuclear family), 9 economics (by undermining Indigenous economies and
10. Ibid at 33; Qwo-Li Driskill et al, "Introduction" in Driskill et al, Queer Indigenous Studies, supra
note 1, 1 [Driskill et al, "Introduction"].
11. Finley, supra note 1 at 32.
12. Patriarchy is reliant on heteronormativity, though too often this goes missing in discussions
about sexism. It is useful to take up the term "heteropatriarchy" to show how heterosexism and
heteronormativity operate in relation to gender oppression
13. Qwo-Li Driskill et al, "The Revolution is for Everyone: Imagining an Emancipatory Future
through Queer Indigenous Critical Theories" in Driskill et al, Queer Indigenous Studies, supra note 1,
211 at 217 [emphasis in original] [Driskill et al, "The Revolution"].
14. Finley, supra note 1 at 34.
15. Ibid.
16. See Sarah Deer, "Decolonizing Rape Law: A Native Feminist Synthesis of Safety and
Sovereignty" 24:2 Wicazo Sa Rev 149.
17. Alex Wilson, "N'tacimowin inna nah': Our Coming In Stories" 26:3-4 Can Woman Studies 193
at 194-195.
18. Finley, supra note 1 at 32.
19. Nan Seuffert, "Reproducing Empire in Same-Sex Relationship Recognition and Immigration
Law Reform" in Robert Leckey & Kim Brooks, eds, Queer Theory: Law, Culture, Empire (New York:
Routledge, 2010) 173 at 176 [Leckey & Brooks, Law, Culture, Empire].
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labour roles),2" law, governance, stereotypes about Indigenous people, and
dispossession of land.21 Indigenous peoples not only face systemic sexism
and homophobia in settler society, but also these problems also manifest in
complicated ways in Indigenous communities.22 For example, Alex Wilson
explains that most of the Indigenous people that she interviewed felt they
could only be openly gay once they left their community.23 Further, Driskill
et al. emphasize that:
Colonialism, poverty, homophobia, displacement, suicide, and rejection
by our families and communities are parts of our lives. This is not said
to perpetuate notions of tragic victimry that so often haunt writing about
Indigenous peoples. Instead, it is said to point outthe material and political
conditions that Native GLBTQ2 people experience under colonization,
including colonization's accompanying systems of heteropatriarchy,
gender regimes, capitalism, ableism, ageism, and religious oppression.24
These problems are ongoing and overlooking them in discussions about
decolonization risks perpetuating heteropatriachal oppression. Sex, gender,
and power matter and need to be a part of conversations about Indigenous
laws. However, the literature on queer Indigenous studies is largely silent on
the subject of Indigenous laws. 25 This oversight is significant as Indigenous
laws are central to Indigenous self-determination, 26 and Indigenous laws
can also be drawn on for considering how heteropatriarchy can be both
perpetuated and challenged in Indigenous laws. Queer Indigenous studies
is an invaluable part of this conversation, though there is a need for further
critical reflection regarding the treatment of the past (and present). While I
address this in more detail in the following sections, it is worth stating that
there is a need for a conceptual shift from focusing entirely on conflict as
manifested only in and by colonization to understanding how Indigenous
peoples also grappled with conflict in the past. The shift here is to
recognize the importance of arguments regarding the relationship between
20. See Gilden, supra note 7.
21. For a discussion on land see Finley, supra note 1 at 34-35.
22. See ibid at 34; Driskill et al, "The Revolution," supra note 13 at 211.
23. Wilson, supra note 17 at 195-196. See also: Driskill et al, "The Revolution," supra note 13 at
212-213; National Aboriginal Health Organization, "Suicide Prevention and Two-Spirited People"
(Ottawa: NAHO, 2012) at 6 [NAHO].
24. Driskill et al, "The Revolution," supra note 13 at 211.
25. Finley, supra note I at 39, writes about Denetdale's research on the Dine MarriageAct (Jennifer
Denetdale, "Carving Navajo National Boundaries: Patriotism, Tradition, and the Dine Marriage Act
of 2005" (2008) 60:2 American Q 289), though Finley's work is not focused on Indigenous laws and I
suggest that there also needs to be sustained, devoted attention to Indigenous laws, legal analysis, and
legal education
26. Borrows, Canada Indigenous Constitution, supra note 3; Napoleon Ayook, supra note 3;
Christie, supra note 3.
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heteronormativity and colonialism, and to recognize the magnitude and
historically recent manifestation of this problem, while also not treating
the past as though everyone in Indigenous societies agreed and as though
there were no conflicts pertaining to sex, gender, and sexuality.
Queer legal studies is helpful for thinking further about power
dynamics in relation to law. Sex, gender, and sexuality operate and are
constructed in law (albeit in different ways in different legal orders).2" Kim
Brooks and Debra Parkes explain, "queer theory seeks to demonstrate
that all sexual behavior is socially constructed and that sexuality is not
determined by biology. Instead, sexuality is understood as a matrix of social
codes; sexual difference cannot be disaggregated from culture. Queer
legal theory applies this understanding of how sexuality is constructed to
law."28 Robert Leckey and Kim Brooks argue that many of the discussions
about sexuality and (state) law fall more so under gay and lesbian rights
approaches in which discrete identity categories are asserted and inserted
into existing legal structures.29 They explain, "such work is usually taken
up through a presumptively unqueer lens of liberal legalism, including the
courts' responses to activists' deployment of liberal rights instruments."3
Further, Elaine Craig explains that the gay and lesbian rights approach
entrenches the binary of heterosexual/homosexual, whereas queer legal
theory works to deconstruct this very binary.31 Queer legal theory focuses
on "a larger transformative project" of deconstructing and challenging
heteronormativity as it is perpetuated in/by law.32 Brooks and Parkes note
that an intersectional approach (how sexuality, gender, race, class, and
ability intersect) to queer lives is key33 and that queer legal studies "seek[s]
to complicate our understanding of identity.""
One significant area where there is need for further complication
pertains to colonialism and indigeneity in relation to queer legal studies.
If queer studies is shaped by settler-colonial relations,3" then queer legal
27. Law is one site in which this happens.
28. Kim Brooks & Debra Parkes, "Queering Legal Education: A Project of Theoretical Discovery"
(2004) 27 Harv Women's U 89 at 97. In arguing that sexuality is a social construction, it is not my
intention to deny the materiality of the body. Materiality and the things that bodies do are interpreted
and our interpretations are connected to social contexts.
29. Robert Leckey & Kim Brooks, "Introduction" in Leckey & Brooks, Law, Culture, Empire, supra
note 19, 1 at 4 [Leckey & Brooks, "Introduction"].
30. Ibid.
31. Elaine Craig, "Converging Feminist and Queer Legal Theories: Family Feuds and Family Ties"
(2010) 28:1 Windsor YB Access Just 209 at 214.
32. Brooks & Parkes, supra note 28 at 90. See also Craig, supra note 31 at 213.
33. Brooks & Parkes, supra note 28 at 90.
34. Ibidat 101.
35. Driskill et al, "Introduction," supra note 10 at 21.
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studies needs to recognize that analyzing heteronormativity necessitates
analyzing colonialism and deconstructing state-Indigenous hierarchies
pertaining to law. Leckey and Brooks' edited collection on queer theory
makes important contributions regarding questions about law and empire
building.36 The building of nation-states aims to discipline non-normative
sexualities and genders into forms that support the nation (for example,
same-sex marriages that replicate the nuclear family),3" and queer theory
itself can end up contributing to empire building if it is articulated in ways
that take for granted and support "the" nation and its laws.3" White men are
the "invisible" subjects in much of queer theory, and Leckey and Brooks
ask, "[i]s [queer theory] a politically salient resource, or itselfa technology
of neocolonialism, captured by the interests of those most or earliest
represented by it [that is, white gay men in western nation-states] ?"39
Brooks and Parkes note that Indigenous experiences-queer and non-
queer-need to be part of discussions about law. They observe, "[h]owever,
it is hard to know how to incorporate such a view in a legal pedagogy.
This difficulty reveals that while tinkering at the edges of legal education
may resolve some issues for some outsiders, it will take a much more
transformative project to make legal education a locus of social justice."4
Indeed, this transformation requires a major deconstruction-not just
acknowledging and including Indigenous people, peoples, and laws, but
centring them so as to fundamentally change the conversation.41
Indigenous legal studies is invaluable in this regard, as it already centres
Indigenous people and laws. However the revitalization and practices of
Indigenous laws will be partial and queer citizens will be sidelined if sex,
gender, and sexuality are not taken seriously. Napoleon argues that "[i]n
the Aboriginal political landscape, there is an absence of voices advocating
that sexual orientation and transgenderism are significant Aboriginal
issues" and energy is expended elsewhere, for instance, in fighting for
Aboriginal rights and title.42 Sexuality thus gets detached in these legal
discussions and the problems that exist in Indigenous communities with
homophobia, transphobia, and sexism are overlooked. What is troubling
is that these problems are not centred-that is, fundamentally altering the
36. Leckey & Brooks, Law, Culture, Empire, supra note 19.
37. Leckey & Brooks, "Introduction," supra note 29 at 6. See also Seuffert, supra note 19.
38. Leckey & Brooks, supra note 29 at 7.
39. Ibid. Regarding the white male subject as central, see also Suzanne Lenon, "White as Milk:
Proposition 8 and the Cultural Politics of Gay Rights" (2013) 36:1 Atlantis 44.
40. Brooks & Parkes, supra note 28 at 116.
41. This centring is akin to what Brooks and Parkes suggest with the centring of queer people and
experiences in legal pedagogy (ibid at 119).
42. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 149.
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conversation-in Indigenous legal studies. I have argued elsewhere that
Indigenous men are often positioned as the universal subject in discussions
about Indigenous law,43 and this subject is also heterosexual. When only
these subject positions are centred, then articulations of Indigenous law can
be a mis-fit for other citizens-overlooking, denying, and even solidifying
marginalization.
Feminist theory and queer theory are often treated as being at odds
with one another,44 yet to treat the two approaches as incompatible not
only oversimplifies the diversity of feminist and queer approaches, but
also ignores the intersections of sex, gender, and sexuality.45 Indigenous
feminist legal studies encourages questions about gender and power
and considers how sexism can operate and be perpetuated in Indigenous
laws, at the expense of full legal subjecthood and civic engagement for
Indigenous women and people with non-normative gender expression.46
These questions about power also need to be asked of homophobia and
transphobia.47 While queer issues are frequently absent in discussions
about Indigenous feminism,48 there are scholars who create meaningful
conversations between queer Indigenous studies and Indigenous feminist
studies.49 For myself, queering Indigenous legal studies is intimately
connected to, and expands on, work that I have done (alone and with
43. Snyder, "IFLT," supra note 5 at 366-367.
44. Craig explains: "Queer theorists have critiqued feminist theories for being anti-sex, overly
moralistic, essentialist, and statist. Feminist theorists have rejected queer theory as being uncritically
pro-sex and dangerously protective of the private sphere" (Craig, supra note 31 at 210).
45. Ibid at 211.
46. Snyder, "IFLT," supra note 5. The tenets of Indigenous feminist legal theory include:
an understanding of Indigenous laws and societies as gendered; a commitment to
intersectional analysis; an attentiveness to power that includes examining how gendered
power dynamics play out in the meanings, perceptions, and practices of Indigenous laws;
an approach that is anti-essentialist and understands gender, sex, and sexuality as plural
and complex; and a spirit of critique that challenges rigid and romanticized notions about
tradition, gender roles, and law (ibid at 388).
47. See also Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 (discussed more below).
48. Snyder, "IFLT," supra note 5 at 382.
49. See for example, Finley, supra note 1 at 40; Driskill et al, "Introduction," supra note 10 at 8-9;
Driskill et al, "The Revolution," supra note 13 at 219.
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others) on Indigenous feminist legal theory,5" and indeed it raises broader
questions about omissions and gaps in my own work as well as the pressing
question about how best to address this intersection. When I use the phrase
"queering Indigenous legal studies," Indigenous feminist legal theory
should be read into this approach (and vice versa). Craig, although writing
about Canadian common law, makes the important point that "activists,
advocates and litigants are all well served by approaching complex legal
problems involving sex, sexuality and gender with as many 'methods' for
pursuing and achieving justice as possible" and that doing so is "more
likely to cut ajudicious path."51 Similarly, queering can help to cut a more
judicious path in Indigenous legal studies.
II. Examining existing paths
I turn now to examples where scholars in the area of Indigenous law
have written about sex, gender, and sexuality. A handful of people have
taken up this work and I focus on three arguments: Gilden's, Denetdale's,
and Napoleon's. Although they do not write explicitly about queering
Indigenous legal studies, they each take 2LGBTQ realities and Indigenous
laws seriously. Gilden argues that Navajo laws are welcoming to those who
are queer, while Denetdale contends that Navajo laws can get interpreted
in ways that work to oppress those who are queer.52 Napoleon looks more
broadly at Indigenous peoples in Canada and argues that Indigenous laws
can be used to respond to 2LGBTQ-based oppression. 3
1. Putting the "pieces back in place "?"
Gilden examines how sex and gender fluidity (which he calls "berdachism")
were historically a part of Navajo society, were (and are) targeted for
elimination via colonization, and contends that principles pertaining to
gender fluidity have now been reintroduced in Navajo tribal courts.5 He
50. See for example: Snyder, "IFLT," supra note 5; Emily Snyder, Miyo-wicohtown/Good
Relations: Gender, Power, Cree Law [under review] [Snyder, Good Relations]; Emily Snyder,
"Gender and Indigenous Law" (2013), Report prepared for the University of Victoria Indigenous Law
Research Unit, online: <indigenousbar.ca/indigenouslaw/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Gender-and-
Indigenous-Law-report-March-31-2013-ESnyderl.pdf>; Val Napoleon & Emily Snyder, "Indigenous
Laws and Housing on Reserve: Developing an Indigenous Property Theory and a Critical Indigenous
Feminist Property Theory" [unpublished]; Emily Snyder, Val Napoleon & John Borrows, "Gender and
Violence: Drawing on Indigenous Legal Resources," (2015) 48:2 UBC L Rev 593; Emily Snyder et al,
Mikomosis and the Wetiko: A Teaching Guide for Youth, Community, and Post-Secondary Educators
(Victoria: Indigenous Law Research Unit, 2014).
51. Craig, supra note 31 at 212.
52. Gilden, supra note 7; Denetdale, "Securing Boundaries," supra note 7.
53. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7.
54. Gilden, supra note 7 at 267.
55. Ibid at 238.
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asserts that "[b]y tracking the interplay between the traditional values
of child autonomy, gender equality, and tribal collectivism, the rise, fall
and potential reemergence of the berdache tradition can be analyzed
as resulting from shifts in its determinative cultural elements."56 The
principle of child autonomy recognizes children as having their own
agency in making decisions about their identity and who they want to be,
meaning that children can choose their own gender identity (regardless of
their sex).5" Regarding gender equality, he contends that equitable gender
relations in which female and male roles are both valued means that it
does not matter which gender you take up.58 Lastly, he argues that gender
fluidity is welcomed through principles pertaining to tribal collectivism-
that the productivity of people's talents should trump having to perform
the labour of a certain gender role because of one's sexed body.59
While Gilden concedes that "the Navajo courts have not published
any opinion directly dealing with berdachism," he maintains that the
"numerous opinions that address the underlying cultural characteristics
which enabled such gender fluidity to exist in traditional Native American
cultures" are enough to create a welcoming legal space for 2LGBTQ
people .6 The latter half of his argument will be dealt with momentarily,
but overall, Gilden argues that the Navajo courts have set the stage-by
embracing cultural principles that support sex and gender fluidity-for
2LGBTQ people to move back into their rightful place in Navajo law after
years of marginalization resulting from colonial oppression.
Gilden acknowledges some critiques of his work: that there are
Csubstantial obstacles to a true re-emergence of traditional gender
diversity"; that the asserted balanced labour configuration that promotes
equity will be hard to achieve in today's economy; that although women
are supposed to be respected in Navajo society, what actually happens
is otherwise; and that settler norms regarding gender are still strong.6"
However, these critiques are voiced at the end of Gilden's analysis and
therefore do not reveal the larger problems in his approach.
As a starting point, it is necessary to interrogate Gilden's usage of
"berdache." He explains:
[a] large proportion of Native American tribes acknowledged a gender
role that did not conforn to Euro-American notions of male and female.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibidat 242-244.
58. Ibid at 244-245.
59. Ibid at 245-246.
60. Ibid at 258.
61. Ibid at 268.
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This gender role, generically referred to as berdache, represents an
extreme departure from Euro-American gender construction. Berdache
were usually biological men (or, less often, women) who assumed
culturally-defined traits of the opposite gender.62
This definition is dangerously pan-Indigenous, and does not seem to be
as fluid as he claims. He acknowledges that this configuration of sex and
gender is "heterogendered" in that people of the same sex could be in a
relationship together but would be expected to perform opposite gender
roles.63 Questions about a dual configuration of gender and questions
about exclusion as he retains his overall argument about fluidity remain
unaddressed.
Gilden attempts to make the term "berdache" Navajo-specific, noting
the term nfdleeh, which he curiously refers to as "Navajo berdache."64
Driskill et al. explain that berdache is an anthropological term that was
used to describe the sexual differences of Indigenous people compared
to European settlers. The term "two-spirit" is now more commonly used
(at least in North America). However, Driskill et al. note that many non-
Indigenous scholars have misunderstood that "two-spirit" is not intended
to just replace "berdache"; rather, "two-spirit" signals a fundamental
shift from indigeneity being defined and analyzed by others to centring
Indigenous experience and self-definition. 65
Gilden takes Indigenous self-determination and tribal courts seriously,
though he frequently reverts to referring to law as just culture, or
sometimes "customs" and "traditions. 66 Napoleon and Hadley Friedland
argue that it is imperative to treat Indigenous laws "as law .,"67 However,
another challenging aspect of Gilden's research is his focus on tribal
courts, which, he explains, largely follow a state model and are subject to
state regulation. 68 He still frames tribal courts as empowering and overall
Navajo in their approach to law,69 although tribal courts would be just
62. Ibid at 239. Gilden argues that women were well-respected in Native American societies,
particularly Navajo society, and as a result, it was desirable to be berdache, as it typically meant taking
up a female (i.e. respected) role.
63. Ibid at 241, 270, n 134.
64. Ibid at 241.
65. Driskill et al, "Introduction," supra note 10 at 10-11.
66. Gilden, supra note 7 at 267.
67. Val Napoleon & Hadley Friedland, "Indigenous Legal Traditions: From Roots to Renaissance"
in Markus D Dubber & Tatjana H6mle, eds, Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014) 225 at 226 [Napoleon & Friedland, "Roots to Renaissance"] [emphasis in
original].
68. Gilden, supra note 7 at 256-257. For a discussion on band governance in Canada and Indigenous
laws, see, Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 158.
69. Gilden, supra note 7 at 256-257.
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one site in which Navajo law is discussed and exercised." ° Furthermore,
Gilden problematically conflates the assertion of positive principles in law
(particularly in tribal courts) with overall acceptance and a welcoming
climate for 2LGBTQ people. That which is stated in the law does not
necessarily translate into practice, and, as with all legal orders, we cannot
and should not assume that tribal courts (and other legal mechanisms
through which Navajo people practice their laws) are empowering for
everyone. A vital part of queering Indigenous legal studies necessitates
asking questions about power and the ways that homophobia, transphobia,
and sexism can operate in interpretations about Indigenous laws and in
legal decisions. Gilden's analysis becomes paralyzed in the commonplace
narrative about Indigenous difference in which sex, gender, and sexuality
are perfectly fluid, functional, and equitably interpreted for all. He gets
caught up in perpetuating this romanticized narrative at the expense of
meaningfully engaging questions about internal dissent and debate.
Gilden claims, "it does appear that the courts have put some of the
most important pieces back in place."71 This statement problematically
frames Indigenous laws as unchanging relics from the past that just
need to be accessed and "re-infused,17 2 rather than treating Indigenous
laws as ongoing living concepts with which Indigenous people work
and deliberate. 3 This idea of "setting the stage" for 2LGBTQ people is
intriguing. Does Gilden's analysis hope to simply insert queer Navajo
citizens into Navajo law? Or does he explain instead that a fundamental
shift has taken place that centres sex, gender, and sexuality in Navajo law
through amenable values and principles that uphold queer citizens? How
might Gilden's analysis shift if Indigenous laws were treated as more
dynamic? How can one go about queering Indigenous laws if "the right"
social and legal climate is not in place?
2. Power and interpretation
Gilden neglects to attend to the banning of same-sex marriage in the
Navajo nation. He comments on this prohibition that "the berdache
tradition was explicitly heralded by the legislation's opponents." 4 This
70. Indigenous laws can be found, for example, in kinship structures, stories, oral histories,
ceremonies. See Val Napoleon & Richard Overstall, "Indigenous Laws: Some Issues, Considerations
and Experiences" (2007), Opinion paper prepared for the Centre for Indigenous Environmental
Resources at 3, online: <caid.ca/LawIndIss2007.pdf>.
71. Gilden, supra note 7 at 267.
72. Ibidat 258.
73. See JohnBorrows, "(Ab)Originalism and Canada's Constitution" (2012) 58 SCLR 351 [Borrows,
"(Ab)Originalism"]; Napoleon, Ayook, supra note 3.
74. Gilden, supra note 7 at 270.
604 The Dalhousie Law Journal
remark is important-it shows that Navajo citizens (like all citizens)
debate and interpret tradition in various ways and disagree about decisions
made in their community. The contestation shows that much is at stake
with sexuality and Navajo law and that there is a group of people fighting
against the denial of sex and gender diversity. Yet Gilden neglects to deeply
engage these conflicts and fails to address how the position of those who
were fighting for same-sex marriage was marginal and lacked political and
legal power.
In Denetdale's piece on the Din Marriage Act of 2005, she takes a
different approach from Gilden. 5 She examines instead how sex, gender,
and sexuality can be constructed in disempowering ways in law and
how sexism, homophobia, and transphobia can be perpetuated by some
interpretations of Navajo law. 6 She argues that post 9/11, many Navajo
people were getting on board with intensifying American nationalism.
By examining the convergences and conflation of militarized Navajo and
American assertions of nationhood, she shows how colonization, including
the oppression of women and 2LGBTQ people, is erased by interpretations
of Navajo tradition that align with U.S. imperialism. Rather than
acknowledging and tending to issues of colonization and dispossession at
the hands of the U.S., she argues that many Navajo people were (and are)
instead aligning with a "multicultural" U.S. family-fighting to protect
"freedom."" Aligning with U.S. nationalism has especially harmful effects
on Navajo women and 2LGBTQ people whose bodies are policed in the
name of the Navajo (and U.S.) nation. Denetdale draws on Indigenous
feminism to show "the ways in which Navajo national boundaries are
redrawn around patriarchy that promotes Western binaries of feminine and
masculine." 8 She explains that the banning of same-sex marriage through
the Din Marriage Act aligned with the broader movement in the U.S. to
ban same-sex marriage so as to protect the nuclear family and the "family
values" that are central to American nation-building.i 9
75. Though both turn to Navajo law for addressing discrimination.
76. Denetdale, "Securing Boundaries," supra note 7.
77. Ibid at 131, 139.
78. Ibid at 136.
79. Ibid at 142. Fights for same-sex marriage, while they are arguments against discrimination,
can still end up perpetuating heteronormative marriage structures (i.e., two people, nuclear family,
"committed" relationships) that are central to empire building (Seuffert, supra note 19 at 182). What
is telling of this same-sex marriage example is that, regardless of what the Navajo do, they will be
normatively read alongside deeply ingrained stereotypes about sex, gender, and sexuality-if they ban
same-sex marriage, then they might be read as uncivilized (compared with "progressive" nations that
allow it; see ibid at 180); if they embrace same-sex marriage then they might be read as queer (in a
negative way) for their different (compared with settlers) norms regarding sex, gender, and sexuality
(see generally Finley, supra note 1).
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The Dini Marriage Act "discriminates against and calls for the
exclusion of gays, lesbians, trans-genders, and bisexuals in same-sex
partnerships in Navajo society."8 0 While 2LGBTQ people who want to
get married could do so off-reserve (in states where same-sex marriage
is legal), this does not solve the problem of discrimination within Navajo
law, and such a newly martied couple "will not qualify for home-site
leases, property rights or the opportunity to adopt a Native child" within
the Navajo nation." The Din Marriage Act was passed unanimously,
though not without wider opposition from Navajo citizens, then and now. 2
The Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission, for instance, identifies
gender and sex-based oppression in the Navajo nation as a human rights
concern. The commission explains,
[t]his Act has raised questions about civil rights and human rights
violations for those Navajos who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
and queer .... Given that Navajo citizens insist upon equality and equal
treatment for all Navajo citizens, it becomes necessary to critically reflect
upon the intersections of Navajo traditional, customary and common
laws with gender in ways that ensure the civil and human rights of all
Navajo citizens.
Denetdale's analysis of the Din Marriage Act importantly engages
questions about sex, gender, sexuality, interpretation, power, and Indigenous
law. However, it is important that the queering of Indigenous legal studies,
while attentive to issues concerning same-sex marriage, does not get caught
up only in these issues," and does not fall into a rights-based approach in
which 2LGBTQ people are inserted into existing legal structures rather
than asking questions about how oppression operates and is perpetuated
in those structures. This example is again further complicated, as with
80. Denetdale, "Securing Boundaries," supra note 7 at 134. This approach to same-sex marriage is
not unique to the Navajo. As of 2013, "[o]nly five of the [U.S.] nation's 500-pius federally recognized
tribes recognize same-sex marriage" (Shondiin Silversmith, "A Question of Human Rights: Is it
Time to Repeal the Dine Marriage Act?" Navajo Times (4 July 2013), online: Navajo Times <www.
navajotimes.com/news/2013/0713/070413marriage.php>). Further, disallowing same-sex marriage is
not unique to Indigenous nations, as is evidenced by laws banning same-sex marriage in various
American states (see Denetdale, "Securing Boundaries," supra note 7).
81. Alysa Landry, "Same-Sex Marriages: Unrecognized in Navajo Culture, but for How Long,"
Indian Country (13 February 2014), online: Indian Country <http:/indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.
com/2014/02/13/same-sex-marriages-unrecognized-navaj o-culture-how -long- 153512> (reporting
from a discussion with Alray Nelson).
82. See Silversmith, supra note 80; Landry, supra note 81.
83. Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission, Navajo Women & Gender iolence is a Human
Rights Issue, (2014), online: <www.nnhrc.navajo-nsn.gov/WomenGenderViolence.html>. The
NNHRC was established by the Navajo Nation Council. At the time of writing, the Dine MarriageAct
is still in effect.
84. Driskill et al, "The Revolution," supra note 13 at 213.
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Gilden's, in that Navajo law is being expressed, claimed, and articulated
through governance structures that resemble those of the U.S.
Denetdale's examination shows that the discrimination that exists in
Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities can, and does, play out in
some articulations of Indigenous law. She shows that interpretations of
tradition that are "for the nation" can sometimes cause harm and come
at the expense of some Indigenous citizens over others. These are vital
arguments. However, there is still something troubling about her analysis,
and it returns to the issue of interpreting oppression, colonialism, and the
past. Queering Indigenous laws is complex: if queer (Indigenous) (legal)
theory analyzes heteronormativity, and if heterornormativity is intimately
tied up with colonialism, how can one address internal power dynamics
in Indigenous laws in a way that recognizes this outside/internalized
force but also recognizes the general complexities inherent in any legal
order regarding questions about normalcy, constructions of identity, and
power? That is, how can one account for the important analyses above but
not get subsumed by them at the expense of overlooking challenges that
Indigenous peoples have faced within their own societies?
The use of tradition to ban same-sex marriage is grounded in colonial
beliefs, rather than traditional Navajo beliefs, Denetdale argues." This
raises many questions that are important to the queer use and study of
Indigenous laws: What constitutes traditional Navajo (or other Indigenous)
beliefs and practices (there will and should be many answers to this)?
According to whom, and to whose benefit or disadvantage? How are
Indigenous laws being imagined? As static artifacts found only in the
past? Or as dynamic, living, intellectual tools that have continuity but can
change?86 If oppressive interpretations of Indigenous law are framed as
colonial, how can these interpretations be engaged with using Indigenous
laws in a way that does not treat Indigenous laws and people as incapable
of oppression?
In an Indian Country online article about the Din Marriage Act, Alray
Nelson, a Navajo 2LGBTQ activist, contends that "[h]atred is foreign to
[the Navajo] as a people.""7 It is not just 2LGBTQ Navajo identity that is
at stake in these debates, but Navajo identity generally. There is a need
to work in between conceptualizations of Indigenous peoples as brutes
(sexist, homophobic, hateful) and depictions of Indigenous peoples and
85. Denetdale, "Securing Boundaries," supra note 7.
86. Napoleon & Friedland, "Roots to Renaissance," supra note 67; Napoleon, Ayook, supra note 3;
Borrows, "(Ab)Originalism," supra note 73; Borrows, Canada ' Indigenous Constitution, supra note
3.
87. Landry, supra note 81.
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laws as already undoubtedly perfectly queer (inclusive of everyone,
agreed upon by everyone, and equitable in every regard), so as to deepen
the discussion and more realistically engage with Indigenous laws.
In the Navajo Times, Nelson suggests three options for changing the
Din Marriage Act: using the Navaj o court system and arguing that the Act
is discriminatory; trying to get council to change the Act to be inclusive; or
putting the issue to a vote across the Navajo nation.88 Denetdale contends
that while people disagree on the meaning of multiple genders in Navajo
society, people do acknowledge the existence of multiple genders,89 and
she suggests that people turn to creation stories to better understand
the place of 2LGBTQ people in Navajo society.9" Both Nelson and
Denetdale suggest turning to Navajo laws to address questions regarding
discrimination. Discussions about creation stories, legal arguments in the
tribal court system, debates at the level of council, and voting amongst
the people will no doubt involve various interpretations of sex, gender,
sexuality, tradition, law, and identity, and will require an attentiveness to
power dynamics and how these constructs operate in and through law is
key to queering Indigenous law and legal studies.
3. Using Indigenous laws to challenge oppression
Some Aboriginal societies historically were sexist and homophobic,
and many still are. They face the same challenges as do all the groups
that now comprise Canadian mainstream society .... However, there is an
underlying assumption in mainstream society thatAboriginal societies are
hopelessly paralyzed in a kind of time warp-that without the civilizing
restraints of Canadian law, they would immediately revert to oppressive
sexist, homophobic, and who knows what other practices. The racist,
colonial subtext is that Aboriginal people can only overcome paralyzing
social dysfunction by adopting the western liberal framework. 9'
In a National Aboriginal Health Organization (NAHO) booklet on suicide
prevention for 2LGBTQ youth, it is noted that one of the ways that
service providers can help Indigenous youth in distress is by familiarizing
themselves with the Canadian Human Rights Act.92 The suggestion
reads, "[the Act] has been in effect on reserve since June 2008, and it
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." 93 Although
reserves are state-imposed structures, one cannot help but wonder why
88. Silversmith, supra note 80.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid, Denetdale, "Securing Boundaries," supra note 7 at 143.
91. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 158.
92. NAHO, supra note 23 at 11; Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6.
93. NAHO, supra note 23 at 11.
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Indigenous laws are overlooked as means for resolving conflicts. Indeed,
the suggestion to turn elsewhere for help might, in some cases, be desired.
However, Canadian society more generally and the Canadian legal system
specifically also contend with and perpetuate homophobic, transphobic,
and sexist oppression (alongside issues of systemic racism) and this call to
use state law reinforces the problem that Napoleon's above quote speaks
to-the treatment of state laws as providing solutions for problems in
Indigenous communities. Many 2LGBTQ people (and other Indigenous
people) are unlikely to perceive state law as a safe resource given its role
in supporting and enforcing colonial oppression and denying Indigenous
laws and self-determination.94
In fairness to NAHO, their booklet is oriented to drawing internally on
Indigenous solutions to social issues in Indigenous communities, and the
problem in directing service providers to the Canadian Human Rights Act
seems to perhaps revolve more around NAHO's approach to "law." The
internal resources available to Indigenous peoples are treated as "culture"
(and "tradition"), and while there is an intimate connection between culture
and law,95 it is also vital, to reiterate Napoleon and Friedland's point, to
treat Indigenous laws "as law."96
Napoleon argues that Indigenous legal orders should be drawn on
to challenge the homophobia that exists in Indigenous communities. 97
She explains that "[f]inding ways to recognize and protect rights within
Aboriginal nations and legal orders is about nation building and social
change for Aboriginal communities." 98 However, how to go about doing
this is an entirely different question (and one with many answers). 99 In her
article examined here, Napoleon draws on the work of Celestine Nyamu's
"three-stage 'critical paradigmatic approach"' and suggests the following:
(1) Challenge any constitutional framework and other social processes
and mechanisms that protect customary and religious laws from
questioning, so that room is created for diverse voices and changes
to community norms. (2) Generate empirical evidence of varied and
alternative local cultural practices (e.g., Aboriginal sexual orientation,
transgenderism, and alternative approaches to identity and gender
equality) to counteract negative, ossified cultural rhetoric. This type of
94. See Mary Ellen Turpel, "Patriarchy and Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian State for First
Nations Women" (1993) 6:1 CJWL 174 at 183.
95. Leckey & Brooks, "Introduction," supra note 29 at 4.
96. Napeleon & Friedland, "Roots to Renaissance," supra note 67 [emphasis in original].
97. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 158.
98. Ibid at 167.
99. See Hadley Friedland, "Reflective Frameworks: Methods for Accessing, Understanding and
Applying Indigenous Laws" (2012) 11:1 Indigenous LJ 1 at 3 [Friedland, "Reflective Frameworks"].
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evidence could be used in developing new case law within Aboriginal
practice as well as in developing self-government programs. (3) Identify
the concepts of fairness and justice within the culture, and then figure
out how to apply these principles to issues of sexual orientation,
transgenderism, and gender equality. In other words, what are the
underlying principles or values of the oppressive cultural practice, and
how might these be interpreted so as not to oppress women, gay men,
lesbians, and transgendered people?'
Elsewhere in the paper Napoleon contends "that the legal principles
within pre-contact Aboriginal legal orders affecting individual and
collective rights can be articulated and extended to apply to current-day
sexual orientation and transgender issues in Aboriginal communities."
1 0 1
Since this piece was written in 2002, one can see shifts in Napoleon's
work. She would now likely use a different legal methodology for using
Indigenous laws to engage problems pertaining to 2LGBTQ oppression, 10 2
and her work also emphasizes the importance of understanding
Indigenous laws as dynamic and used over time-there are resources in
pre-contact configurations of Indigenous law and there are also resources
in Indigenous societies that are born of both historical and contemporary
circumstances. 1
03
No one method exists for working with and queering Indigenous
legal studies and laws.1' 4 Napoleon's work invites consideration of how to
draw on Indigenous laws in ways that are ongoing and open to discussion.
While I have questions about how sex, gender, and sexuality are framed
in relation to economics in the 2002 article, these issues can be critically
engaged. For instance, Napoleon observes that "[t]he living arrangements
for same-sex couples or gay men and lesbian women appeared to depend
on the extent to which they could obtain economic autonomy and generate
wealth. Access to and control of land, resources, and food supplies within
100. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 169. Drawing on: Celestine I Nyamu, "How
Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in
Developing Countries?" (2000) 41:2 Harv Intl LJ 381.
101. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 150.
102. See Hadley Friedland& Val Napoleon, "Gathering the Threads: Indigenous Legal Methodology"
Lakehead ULJ [forthcoming]. See also Napoleon & Friedland, "Roots to Renaissance," supra note
67; Val Napoleon & Hadley Friedland, "An Inside Job: Engaging with Indigenous Legal Traditions
through Stories" in Dale Turner, ed, Oxford Handbook of Indigenous People 's Politics, Oxford:
Oxford University Press [forthcoming]. In saying that Napoleon would take up a new methodology, I
mean to suggest that this method would work with the ideas in note 101, not against them.
103. Napoleon, Ayook, supra note 3. Though Napoleon has not since written explicitly about sexuality
and Indigenous law, her critical engagement with Indigenous laws supports queering Indigenous legal
studies.
104. For a discussion about divergent methods generally in the field of Indigenous law, see Friedland,
"Reflective Frameworks," supra note 99.
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the economic framework determined the extent to which any individual
member could be relatively autonomous in the society."1 5 If, for example,
a woman could not hunt (and thus did not have economic stability),
then maybe she would not take a same-sex partner (if that woman could
not hunt).1"6 This raises questions about the interpretation of economic
stability then and now, and the relationship between family arrangements,
economics, and sexuality. What is the relationship between sex, gender,
sexuality, economics, and Indigenous laws today?.. 7 How can these be, as
Napoleon herself would ask, "interpreted so as to not oppress" 2LGBTQ
people?"'8
III. Challenges of queering Indigenous legal studies
There are many challenges generally in queering legal education,0 9 and
specific challenges in queering Indigenous legal studies. One of these
challenges includes a shortage of scholarly work about 2LGBTQ issues
and Indigenous law, though I hope this paper has begun to show that despite
this problem, there are some people working in this area, and conversations
to be had across critical frameworks-but these conversations need to be
taken up.
There is a serious omission in Indigenous legal studies regarding sex,
gender, and sexuality-which are part of all of our identities and shape
our lives in various ways. Perhaps one of the most basic, and complicated,
explanations for the lack of attention paid to 2LGBTQ concerns regarding
Indigenous law isthatbecause heteronormativity, homophobia, transphobia,
and sexism are major social problems in settler society and Indigenous
nations, it is unsurprising and quite logical that heteronormativity (which
silences and invalidates 2LGBTQ issues) predominates.
Brooks and Parkes contend that "[b]ecause queer legal theory is still
in its relative infancy, we have the advantage of not having to break old
molds. Instead, we are free to continue to explore how queer legal pedagogy
may affect our strategies for the broader goal of social justice."1 Can
we say this about Indigenous legal studies, which is an emergent field
in academia? Some weighty identity politics will need to be addressed
head-on in the work of queering Indigenous legal studies. In addition
to entrenched oppression, there are also significant hurdles concerning
105. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 155.
106. Ibid at 155-156.
107. See also Gilden, supra note 7 at 253.
108. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 169.
109. See generally Brooks & Parkes, supra note 28.
110. Ibid at 135.
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fundamentalist and romanticized narratives about Indigenous identity,111
which intersect with sex, gender, and sexuality, and can translate into
limiting narratives about tradition, culture, and law. Indigenous laws,
traditions, spiritualities, or cultures are not inherently fundamentalist.
Rather, an analysis of fundamentalisms as outlined here necessitates
examining fundamentalist interpretations of law-interpretations that
narrowly define the possibilities of law and peoples, and which can be
found in both Indigenous and non-Indigenous legal practices.
One potential rebuttal to queering Indigenous legal studies is that the
task itself is entirely unnecessary-when Indigenous people are talking
about law and legal subjects, they already imagine gender fluidity to be
a part of that conversation-norms in Indigenous legal orders, informed
by cultural values, already "queer" law and legal agents are also already
"queered." This might be the case for some people when they talk about
Indigenous law, and it certainly speaks to the arguments above that there
are resources in Indigenous laws for engaging questions pertaining to sex,
gender, sexuality, and power."' However, people who are already queering
Indigenous people and laws are not necessarily doing this in similar ways
and there are variations across legal orders and from person to person. It is
critical to be cautious of the ways that these rebuttals against queer theory
could be stated in more fundamentalist, romanticizing, and generalizing
terms, rather than nuanced ones.
There are striking similarities between rebuttals against Indigenous
feminism and rebuttals against queering indigeneity. For example,
one common rebuttal is that feminist and queer Indigenous politics are
individualistic and divide (collectively oriented) Indigenous nations.113
Another rebuttal is that feminist and queer theories are western frameworks
that should not be used by Indigenous people. These sentiments are evident
from responses to Indigenous feminists who, for example, get labeled
as "traitors" or as colonized,114 though a robust body of literature on
Indigenous feminisms works to problematize this critique.115 One possible
111. For discussions about fundamentalisms and Indigenous identity see: Scott Richard Lyons,
X-Marks: Native Signatures of Assent (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Verna St
Denis, "Real Indians: Cultural Revitalization and Fundamentalism in Aboriginal Education" in Carol
Schick, JoAnn Jaffe & Ailsa M Watkinson, eds, Contesting Fundamentalisms (Winnipeg: Fernwood,
2004) 35.
112. See Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7.
113. Ibid.
114. Joyce Green, "Taking Account of Aboriginal Feminism" in Joyce Green, ed, Making Space for
Indigenous Feminism (Winnipeg: Fernwood, 2007) 20 at 25 [Green, Making Space].
115. See, e.g., the edited collections Green, Making Space, ibid; Cheryl Suzack et al, eds, Indigenous
Women and Feminism: Politics, Activism, Culture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
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explanation for the resistance to queering and queer theories more broadly
could relate to the western deployment of queer theory in academia and
to the hegemonic relationship between queerness and whiteness (which
is also a problem in mainstream feminism). Suzanne Lenon critiques the
whitening of LGBTQ politics in which too often, race and queerness get
separated-queerness gets whitened (and thus de-racialized as whiteness is
made "invisible") and LGBTQ issues get contrasted with and differentiated
from race-based politics and issues.116 However, she explains that
[q]ueer/critical race scholars have long theorized and critiqued such
a single-axis understanding of identity and power: it essentializes
identities, privileges a forgetting of contemporary racial injustices,
recentres whiteness, denies homophobia among white people [as
LGBTQ advocates are often depicted as white], and relieves lesbian/
gay/queer movements from accountability to anti-racist agendas."'
The ways that queerness gets "whitened" are problematic; however, queer
theory (as with feminist theory) has been and continues to be used by people
of colour in ways that challenge white, western, colonial deployments of
the term.
Another rebuttal against the gendering and queering of Indigenous
laws and legal studies is that Indigenous societies respect and honour
women and two-spirit people. The language of honouring and respecting
is particularly common in definitions of "two-spiritedness." The NAHO
booklet for example, explains that "[h]istorically, many First Nations
cultures supported and honoured two-spirited people; these individuals
served important community functions and held positions of high regard
and prestige." 1 8 While this orientation towards respect is crucial when
thinking about queering Indigenous legal studies, we should be cautious of
how it is deployed-in ways that can mitigate the realities of homophobic,
transphobic, and sexist violence happening in Indigenous communities,
and in ways that can romanticize and privilege certain ways of being queer.
This latter point concerns identity struggles pertaining to Indigenous
authenticity that predominate in Indigenous communities. 9 Verna St.
Denis argues, "' [a]uthentic' cultural Aboriginal identity has become high
currency. Some of the markers of cultural authenticity include speaking
one's Aboriginal language, having knowledge of and participating in a
116. Lenon, supra note 39. Lenon's analysis would benefit from the explicit inclusion of Indigenous
peoples and colonial context.
117. Ibidat 50-51.
118. NAHO, supra note 23 at 3.
119. For a discussion on authenticity see Lyons, supra note 111.
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myriad of spiritual practices, and having knowledge of traditional stories
and other practices of the past.""12 Her caution about fundamentalist,
hierarchical claims about who the "real Indians" are in revitalization
politics begs an analysis in which one deconstructs claims pertaining to
"real queer Indians." The language of "two-spirit" over "queer" can start a
slippage into this problem, as "two-spirited" Indigenous people often get
explicitly linked up with traditional spirituality and culture.
In the NAHO booklet, "two-spirit" is interpreted in the following way:
Not all First Nations who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered
(GLBT) identify as two-spirited or two-spirit people, but for those who
do, two-spirit is not just another word for GLBT. It is a new term that
has been chosen to reflect traditional First Nations gender diversity,
which includes the fluid nature of sexual and gender identity and its
interconnectedness with spirituality and traditional world views.121
Though the booklet attempts to welcome all identity categories as valid,
one cannot overlook a dichotomy created between the authentic two-
spirit Indian and the GLBT Indigenous people who are described with
'lust another" non-distinct, non-Indigenous "word." ' It is troublesome
that this hierarchy is created at the onset of NAHO's booklet for helping
distressed 2LGBTQ youth at risk of, or struggling with, suicide.
Similarly, Wilson contends, "[w]hen we say that we are two-spirit, we
are acknowledging that we are spiritually meaningful people.1 23 Further,
"[t]wo-spirit identity is one that reflects Aboriginal peoples' process of
'coming in' [as opposed to 'coming out'] to an empowered identity that
integrates their sexuality, culture, gender and all other aspects of who
they understand and know themselves to be. 1 24 Those who engage in this
"[c]oming in" are "being fully present as an Aboriginal person who is
GLBT.1 25 One participant Wilson interviewed noted that they personally
preferred the term two-spirit" over "bi-sexual," as bisexual was too
focused on sex, and not enough on spirituality.126 Driskill et al. conversely
express that in some interpretations, "two-spirit" too heavily centres
spirituality, which can risk creating a hierarchy of authenticity among
Indigenous 2LGBTQ people. 12 There are of course critical discussions
120. St Denis, supra note 111 at 37. See also Lyons, supra note 111 at 73-110.
121. NAHO, supra note 23 at 2 [emphasis added].
122. Ibid.
123. Wilson, supra note 17 at 193.
124. Ibid at 197.
125. Ibid [emphasis added].
126. Ibid at 196.
127. Driskill et al, "Introduction," supra note 10 at 16.
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and usages of the term "two-spirit" and it is important to heed Driskill
et al.'s caution that "Two-Spirit... was not proposed to satisfy a scientific
desire for close correlation between analytical categories and Indigenous
truth. Instead, it was designed as a logic and method to confound such
desires."128
It is critical when queering Indigenous legal studies to also work
against identity hierarchies in which easily "digestible" forms of queerness
are privileged. While this could include configurations of "two-spirit" just
mentioned, it could also include embracing queer Indigenous identities
that closely resemble heteronormative ones, at the expense of more diverse
expressions of sex, gender, and sexuality.129 Queering Indigenous legal
studies entails moving beyond a gay and lesbian rights model of inserting
Indigenous people into Indigenous laws and asks instead for an analysis
in which hierarchies of Indigenous queerness would be deconstructed and
the ways that sex, gender, sexuality, and power operate in Indigenous laws
would be taken seriously. 130
IV. Preliminary propositions: queering Indigenous legal studies
Below are nine preliminary propositions for queering Indigenous legal
studies. The propositions draw on the foregoing discussion and are also
indebted to Brooks and Parkes' principles on queering legal pedagogy.131
What follows is introductory and is just one approach. There should be
many ways for bringing sex, gender, sexuality and power into discussions
about Indigenous law. My approach is focused largely on theory and is
also broadly similar to other "critical" frameworks. The next steps could
entail more specific discussions and analyses-for instance, considering
specific articulations (such as Cree queer legal pedagogy) or applying the
propositions to existing or new methodologies for researching Indigenous
laws and to pedagogies for teaching in the field (and beyond).
First, it is imperative to centre queer Indigenous experiences
in Indigenous legal studies.13 ' As previously noted, centring queer
128. Ibid at 17 [emphasis in original].
129. See Seuffert, supra note 19 at 185.
130. This is akin to Finley's approach more generally with Indigenous studies-aiming to deconstruct
conversations, rather than inserting 2LGBTQ people into existing frameworks (Finley, supra note 1 at
34).
131. Brooks and Parkes suggest eight working principles for queering legal pedagogy, though I do not
work with all of their principles here (Brooks & Parkes, supra note 28 at 117-135). It is important to
not conflate pedagogy and "legal studies"-legal studies includes, but is broader than, just pedagogy.
Brooks and Parkes' work on pedagogy is a valuable resource for getting into this broader discussion
about legal studies though.
132. Brooks and Parkes' first principle of queer legal pedagogy is to centre queer experience (ibid at
118-119).
Queering Indigenous Legal Studies
Indigenous experiences is meant to bring 2LGBTQ Indigenous people
in from the margins133 to show that their experiences, and the study of
heteronormativity, need to be part of the study of Indigenous laws. Queer
experiences matter to, and in, Indigenous legal practice.
Second, sexuality needs to be considered in relation to all aspects of
law.134 It is crucial that discussions about sexuality not get relegated only
to certain subjects, for example, same-sex marriage.135 Sex, gender, and
sexuality are constructed in, and always operating in, Indigenous law, and
as such-regardless of whether someone identifies as queer or not-these
are realities to which attention should be paid. Queering Indigenous legal
studies, as it is discussed in this paper, focuses on queering as a verb-an
act of critically engaging social structures, rather than seeing queer legal
research as something that studies 2LGBTQ people.136
Third, queering Indigenous legal studies requires making obvious,
and deconstructing, power relations.137 This proposition is connected to
each proposition listed here, though it is such an important one that it
requires being stated explicitly. We should be continually asking how sex,
gender, and sexuality are constructed and interpreted in Indigenous law-
by whom, for whom? And how law gets interpreted and practiced-by
whom, for whom? These questions should be asked in each engagement
with Indigenous law.
Fourth, there is a need for challenging homophobia and "denaturalizing
heterosexuality" in discussions about Indigenous law.13 Brooks and
Parkes advocate for a "denaturalizing" of heterosexuality in legal
education, which entails challenging heterosexuality as the "preferred
form of social organization." '139 Scholars in queer Indigenous studies show
how this denaturalizing of heteronormativity must be a central part of
decolonization and revitalization politics.14'
Fifth, intersectionality is key. An intersectional approach includes not
only understanding how sex, gender, and sexuality are intimately related,
but also how they intersect with other constructs, such as race, class,
133. Ibid at 119.
134. All queer legal issues should also be understood as related to race and colonization.
135. Driskill et al, "The Revolution," supra note 13 at 213.
136. See Leckey & Brooks, "Introduction," supra note 29 at 2.
137. This is a variation of Brooks and Parkes' principle to challenge neutrality in state laws (Brooks
& Parkes, supra note 28 at 132).
138. This is a principle of Brooks and Parkes, supra note 28 at 122.
139. Ibid.
140. Driskill et al, "Introduction," supra note 10; Driskill et al, "The Revolution," supra note 13;
Finley, supra note 1.
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and ability. To approach identity in full, these intersections need to be
understood and accounted for in legal practice and education.
Sixth, sex, gender, and sexuality need to be approached as
time-, place-, and culture-specific. Napoleon (among many others) argues
that understandings of law are time-, place-, and culture-specific.141
Likewise, Borrows argues that Indigenous laws must be understood as
"living, contemporary systems" that will necessarily require revisions (as
all legal orders do) to apply to the challenges that people face today."'
Additionally, Brooks and Parkes explain that because "contexts, periods,
and climates" change over time, so too must the frameworks that we use
for understanding identity and law.143
Seventh, it is important to work towards specificity when discussing
Indigenous laws, sex, gender, and sexuality. While there are benefits in
articulating broad frameworks (such as Indigenous legal theory), specificity
also remains crucial and it is important to understand how frameworks
will and should change when used in relation to specific legal orders.144
This is not to suggest that there would be only one way to engage with
questions about sex, gender, and sexuality within a particular legal order.
The earlier discussion about conflicting interpretations of Navajo law
demonstrates that divergent frameworks pertaining to sexuality emerge
in these conversations. A question arises when queering Indigenous legal
studies: what if a specific legal order appears to have heteronormative
traditions and it is argued that, because these norms are traditional, they
should be taken up?145 Again, Napoleon suggests that when faced with
,oppressive cultural practice" or interpretations of law that are oppressive
for 2LGBTQ citizens, one should ask how legal principles within a given
Indigenous legal order can be interpreted to challenge oppression.146 Laws
should be revised if they are oppressive, and Indigenous laws (like all
laws) are resources through which oppression can be perpetuated but also
challenged.
141. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 152.
142. Borrows, Canadas Indigenous Constitution, supra note 3 at 8-9. See also Napoleon, Ayook,
supra note 3.
143. Brooks & Parkes, supra note 28 at 134.
144. Though not talking about law, Driskill et al also argue that specificity is important with Indigenous
communities, while also having connections across a broader 2LGBTQ movement (Driskill et al,
"Introduction," supra note 10).
145. See Denetdale, "Securing Boundaries," supra note 7.
146. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 169.
Queering Indigenous Legal Studies
Eighth, a queer approach to Indigenous legal studies works to
destabilize and unsettle essentialist,14 fundamentalist, and romanticized
interpretations of Indigenous peoples and laws. Such an approach
includes working against identity hierarchies, as argued above. I have
discussed elsewhere the difficulties with the strategic use of essentialisms
and fundamentalisms to push back against colonial oppression (such as
responding to colonial stereotypes about "Indigenous dysfunction" by
asserting representations of Indigenous laws that are perfect).14 Others,
such as Lyons, St. Denis, Napoleon, and Borrows have written about the
challenges and repercussions of deploying fundamentalisms.149 Borrows,
for example, has argued about the challenges that Indigenous peoples
face in Canadian courts-an expectation that Indigenous peoples, their
laws, and cultures, are static and unchanging (ought to be now how
they were before contact). 5 ' He notes that these originalist approaches
(which are only applied to Indigenous people-state law is "allowed"
to change) also get taken up by Indigenous people. He argues, "(Ab)
originalism should not be used to sustain discrimination. Discriminatory
originalism is problematic, regardless of its nature and source. Whether
used by distinguished members of the Supreme Court of Canada, or by
respected elders within Indigenous communities, adverse discrimination
should be rejected as contrary to other constitutional approaches within
each tradition." 5 '
Ninth, and lastly, queering Indigenous legal studies supports building
anti-oppressive communities.152 Given the pervasive problems with
homophobia, transphobia, and sexism in Indigenous communities (as with
other societies), Napoleon contends that
[u]ltimately, Aboriginal families, kinship groups, communities, and
nations must identify who their vulnerable, oppressed members
are, and decide whether to continue the oppression. Choosing to end
discrimination and protect the rights of women, transgendered persons,
gay men, lesbians, and children is the courageous political act of a strong
nation. 153
147. Part ofBrooks and Parkes' approach to queer legal pedagogy also includes avoiding essentialisms
(Brooks & Parkes, supra note 28 at 129).
148. Snyder, Good Relations, supra note 50 at ch 7.
149. Lyons, supra note 111; St Denis, supra note 111; Napoleon, Ayook, supra note 3; Borrows, "(Ab)
Originalism," supra note 73.
150. Borrows, "(Ab)Originalism," supra note 73.
151. Ibidat391.
152. Brooks and Parkes suggest community building as part of one of their eight principles (Brooks
& Parkes, supra note 28 at 124-125).
153. Napoleon, "Raven's Garden," supra note 7 at 170.
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Given the insights from queer Indigenous studies regarding the intimate
relationship between heteropatriarchy and colonialism, this difficult work
is not just the work of Indigenous people. Indeed, as Driskill et al. argue,
and as noted in proposition number two, queering is not just about a
person's identity: it is a framework with which all people should engage
with.154 Brooks and Parkes contend that in the context of legal education,
"nonqueer students and professors could definitely use some queering." '155
Calling out and attending to heteronormative privilege is part of "civic
participation"-living with others in non-violent and anti-oppressive
ways. 56 Learning from various frameworks and disciplines can help
deepen these conversations."'
Conclusion
Brooks and Parkes maintain that as legal educators, we need to be
"conscious of sites and mechanisms of oppression." '58 I have argued that
an approach that is attentive to power needs to be taken up in Indigenous
legal studies and have argued specifically for the urgency of queering.
This article demonstrates that there are resources that can be drawn on
to take up critically oriented research, education, and practice with
Indigenous laws-resources from various fields of study, some existing
resources about 2LGBTQ legal issues, already existing resources about
Indigenous laws that could be amenable to and supportive of queering,
and deliberative engagement with Indigenous laws themselves. Yet this
work needs to be taken up. The propositions that I outlined above provide
an initial framework for this queering. There is a need for additional
and more specific approaches, as well as a need for collective, sustained
future conversations about queering Indigenous legal studies. To turn
away from this work means that Indigenous legal studies will not only
be partial if sex, gender, and sexuality are overlooked, but problems with
homophobia, transphobia, and sexism will go unaddressed and become
further entrenched.
154. Driskill et al, "The Revolution," supra note 13 at 214..
155. Brooks & Parkes, supra note 28 at 91.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid at 125-127; See also Finley, supra note 1.
158. Brooks & Parkes, supra note 28 at 130.
